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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES AFTER 
DAVIS: IS THE GLASS HALF EMPTY OR 
HALF FULL? 
Myrna S. Raeder* 
INTRODUCTION 
The revolution wrought by the 2004 Supreme Court decision 
in Crawford v. Washington1 had its most dramatic impact on 
domestic violence cases. Crawford prohibited courtroom use of 
“testimonial” statements by unavailable witnesses who were not 
previously subjected to cross-examination, unless the defendant 
forfeited the right to confrontation by causing the witness’ 
absence.2 Since the vast majority of victims of domestic violence 
do not cooperate with the prosecution,3 and statements made to 
the police in such circumstances are arguably testimonial, 
Crawford spelled disaster in cases where victims did not testify. 
Numerous reasons have been offered for why these women 
initially call the police and then subsequently refuse to testify in 
court.4 While women want to stop the violence, and calling upon 
the police may be the most likely way to ensure this result, other 
                                                          
* Myrna Raeder is a Professor at Southwestern University School of 
Law. These comments update parts of her article Remember the Ladies and 
Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse 
Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005) [hereinafter Remember the Ladies], in 
light of Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
2 Id. at 62, 68. 
3 Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 328-30; State v. Mechling, 633 
S.E.2d 311, 324-25 (W. Va. 2006). 
4 Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 364; Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 
324-25. 
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complex motivations are also at play.5 For example, their 
batterers are often the fathers of their children, who they love 
and hope will reform. In misdemeanor cases, where the 
punishment is not likely to be lengthy, some women view a 
conviction as jeopardizing their batterer’s ability to hold a job 
and support the family. Other, more sinister reasons for their 
nonappearance include threats or physical violence aimed at 
preventing their testimony and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) caused by their repeated abuse. 
In an earlier era, prosecutions would end when women 
refused to cooperate, but in recent years, zero tolerance for 
domestic violence has gained wide community support.6 This 
resulted in no-drop policies by prosecutorial agencies, and so-
called victimless prosecutions in which a woman’s excited pleas 
for help on 911 calls, and to police at crime scenes, were 
admitted along with testimony by police officers and medical 
personnel concerning any bruises or other indications of 
violence.7 Statements by the absent victims satisfied the pre-
Crawford reliability based approach to the Confrontation Clause 
adopted by Ohio v. Roberts.8 
In contrast, after the first wave of dismissals and reversals 
caused by Crawford, victim’s advocates worried that the 
testimonial approach would return us to the days when domestic 
violence was considered a private concern, not a public outrage. 
Instead, Crawford’s failure to define what is testimonial led to 
two years of judges reading tea leaves, and reaching contrary 
outcomes.9 To the relief of prosecutors, a number of courts 
began to admit victims’ excited utterances made in 911 calls and 
to the police in the field, finding them to be “nontestimonial.” 
These courts reasoned that such statements were simply cries for 
help, not police interrogation, or they were too informal to 
resemble the ex parte affidavits or prior testimony that had been 
                                                          
5 See generally Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 325-30. 
6 Id. at 327-28, 368. 
7 Id. at 328. 
8 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
9 Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 333-47. 
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traditionally excluded by the Confrontation Clause.10 
In Davis v. Washington11 the Court has finally addressed 
these issues, and rendered a split decision that satisfies neither 
the prosecution nor the defense. Davis combined two separate 
domestic violence cases, in which neither of the female victims 
appeared at trial. The decision unanimously affirmed the 
admission of a 911 call in Davis,12 but with only one dissent,13 
rejected the admission of statements in Hammon14 made by the 
defendant’s wife who spoke excitedly to an officer in person at 
the scene. To reach these results, Davis adopted a “primary 
purpose” test for determining whether a statement is testimonial, 
which provides that when the circumstances objectively indicate 
that there is no ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution, a statement is 
testimonial.15 
The defense will be pleased that Davis held that volunteered 
statements were products of interrogation and employed an 
objective evaluation of motivation for determining if a statement 
is testimonial, which arguably favors a broader view of 
confrontation. However, treating dual purpose statements as 
nontestimonial in the absence of a primary motivation to create 
testimony clearly favors the government, because it denies the 
defendant the ability to cross-examine declarants who make such 
statements. For example, defendants will not be able to cross-
examine absent complainants who made damning statements 
against them whenever the primary motivation of the 
interrogation was to obtain assistance during an ongoing 
emergency. 
Conversely, prosecutors will be pleased that the new test 
focuses on the primary purpose of the interrogation, rather than 
requiring that police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency be 
                                                          
10 Id. at 333-36. 
11 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006). 
12 Id. at 2280 (affirming State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005)). 
13 See id. at 2280-81. 
14 Id. (reversing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005)). 
15 Id. at 2273-74. 
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the sole motivation. However, prosecutors may be concerned 
about the apparent focus on the police officer’s motivation,16 not 
merely the motivation of the absent witness. Moreover, Davis 
did not create a separate category for domestic violence cases, 
which means that testimonial statements are still barred unless a 
victim testifies, or there is specific evidence that the defendant 
caused the victim’s absence from trial.17 
Judges will likely find that Davis’ bright line is illusory and 
hard to apply. Indeed, Justice Thomas called the test 
unworkable,18 and it appears no more predictable than the 
reliability standard that Crawford abandoned.19 Moreover, 
Justice Scalia, who authored both Crawford and Davis, 
recognized that the nature of the statement may change once the 
exigency is over, requiring courts to carefully redact 
statements.20 At a minimum, Davis settled that the identity of an 
assailant who is battering a victim as she calls 911 is 
admissible.21 It also should ensure that the admission of any 
statement in response to police questioning after the threat has 
ended, such as when the assailant flees or has been separated 
from the victim, is problematic when the victim does not appear 
at trial, and no evidence of forfeiture exists.22 
After Davis, prosecutors will continue to dismiss or lose 
cases where the testimonial statements are key, unless they take 
the drastic step of arresting victims who ignore their subpoenas, 
a step that punishes victims for the crimes of their abusers. 
Moreover, given the testimonial approach, it makes sense to 
reevaluate how domestic violence felonies and misdemeanors are 
being litigated across America.23 In a world of limited 
prosecutorial resources, decisions may need to be made about 
                                                          
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 2279-80. 
18 Id. at 2285 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
19 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64 (discussing the subjectivity of the 
reliability test). 
20 See id. at 2277-78. 
21 Id. at 2277. 
22 See id. at 2279. See infra Part IV. 
23 See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 367-73. 
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identifying which cases to vigorously pursue in the criminal 
justice system, and which to refer to quasi-criminal diversionary 
programs. 
The remainder of this Article will briefly explore Davis’ 
impact on the following topics in the context of domestic 
violence litigation: (1) assessing whether a statement made to 
law enforcement personnel is testimonial; (2) assessing whether 
a statement made to someone other than law enforcement 
personnel is testimonial; (3) difficulties with the Crawford/Davis 
approach; (4) establishing forfeiture and other procedural issues; 
and (5) suggestions for prosecutors in light of Davis. In addition 
to critiquing Davis and identifying trends in the appellate case-
law, criteria will be suggested to help determine whether or not 
a statement is testimonial, and when forfeiture is appropriate. 
I.  ASSESSING WHETHER A STATEMENT MADE TO LAW 
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IS TESTIMONIAL 
Crawford established the testimonial framework, but gave 
little guidance as to how to interpret it in the domestic violence 
context, where the statements are not made by suspects in 
custody, but by victims frantically seeking help. As a result, 
many courts found such statements far removed from the 
governmental abuse that seemed at the root of Crawford’s 
concerns.24 In contrast, Davis presented two typical domestic 
violence fact patterns that populate one-third of the criminal 
calendars in urban jurisdictions,25 and overwhelmingly rely upon 
complainants who are uncooperative.26 Davis addressed 911 calls 
as well as field investigations, but its holding was generalized, 
focusing more on the context in which the statements were made 
than their method of transmission. The Davis test is deceptively 
                                                          
24 Id. at 333-47. 
25 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 45 (June 2005), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs05.pdf (stating that approximately 
one third of felony assault charges in 11 large counties during a one-month 
period involved family violence). 
26 See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 330. 
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simple: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.27 
While this standard still is capable of wide variation in 
interpretation, at least a few things are set. First, 911 calls can 
be testimonial, regardless of who employs the operator. Second, 
911 calls and preliminary field investigations can generate 
testimonial statements despite their lack of formality. Whether 
Justice Thomas will be proven correct in his view that the 
standard is unworkable28 will depend on how the Supreme Court 
refines it in light of likely conflicts among lower courts in 
defining ongoing emergencies. However, in its current version, 
the standard is little more than a tautology: a statement is not 
testimonial when needed to resolve an ongoing emergency, and 
testimonial when not needed to resolve it. The Court gives few 
concrete suggestions about how to identify an ongoing 
emergency or determine if the statement helps to resolve it, 
other than Justice Scalia’s reference to the instinctive ability of 
officers to distinguish between questions necessary to secure 
their own safety or the safety of the public and questions 
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence.29 In the same vein, 
Davis cavalierly pronounces “testimonial statements are what 
they are.”30 In other words, paraphrasing Justice Stewart’s bon 
mot concerning pornography,31 we will know whether statements 
                                                          
27 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. 
28 Id. at 2285 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
29 Id. at 2277. 
30 Id. at 2279 n.6. 
31 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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help resolve an ongoing emergency when we hear them. 
The absence of any reference to medical emergencies, 
despite such mention in pre-Davis cases,32 would seem to 
indicate a narrow view of nontestimonial statements made to 
police officers. Yet, while statements made well after the 
incident should be fairly easy to discern, some courts are 
already viewing emergencies expansively. This is understandable 
since the transcript of the 911 tape in Davis indicates that the 
defendant left shortly after the start of the call, but the Court did 
not indicate when the call morphed into being testimonial, 
claiming that the only question it certified related to the 
defendant’s identity, which occurred at the beginning of the 
call.33 
Davis emphasized that the caller was speaking in the present 
tense, and that the operator needed information to determine 
what danger the officers would face in resolving the dispute.34 
This was contrasted to the field investigation in Hammon where 
the victim denied any problem and was separated from the 
defendant when she admitted her husband assaulted her.35 Since 
Davis indicated that information “needed to address the exigency 
of the moment”36 was not testimonial, concern has been voiced 
that officers and operators will tailor their questions to obtain 
evidence rather than to resolve the emergency in order to ensure 
admissibility at trial.37 It seems hypertechnical that admission of 
a statement might rest on whether the questioner asks what is 
happening, rather than what happened, but Davis leaves open 
the possibility of such a result. 
Courts have recognized that the Davis analysis is “flexible 
and inherently fact based, and the existence or lack of 
government interrogation does not necessarily determine whether 
                                                          
32 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 557 (Mass. 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006). 
33 126 S. Ct. at 2277. 
34 Id. at 2276. 
35 Id. at 2278. 
36 Id. at 2277. 
37 The Supreme Court—2005 Term Leading Cases, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
125, 217 (2006) [hereinafter Leading Cases]. 
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a statement is testimonial.”38 Several decisions have attempted to 
distill a multifactor test from Davis and some focus on 
statements to police. For example, a statement is not testimonial 
if: (1) the victim spoke about the events as they were actually 
happening; (2) the victim faced a bona fide physical threat; (3) 
the questions and answers viewed objectively were necessary to 
resolve the present emergency, rather than simply learn what 
previously happened; (4) there was a significant difference in the 
formality of questioning between frantic answers given in a 
potentially unsafe environment by phone when compared to the 
calm station house questioning in Crawford.39 Other decisions 
speak more generally: a statement is testimonial if (1) it would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial; (2) the circumstances 
objectively indicate that a statement taken during interrogation 
by a law enforcement officer was made when there was no 
ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose was to prove past 
events rather than to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency; and (3) the focus of analysis was more on the 
witness’ statement, and less upon any interrogator’s questions.40 
However, such tests do not necessarily foretell the outcome of a 
specific case. 
In the Crawford and Beyond symposium, Professor Kirst 
ably attempted to predict the future of Confrontation Clause 
analysis by divining the results of the post-Davis certiorari 
dispositions.41 Several themes emerged, including the 
defendant’s presence or absence from the scene of the incident, 
and whether or not he was under police control.42 However, it is 
unclear that these will ultimately provide the bright lines that 
could make an ongoing emergency test easy to apply. Already 
                                                          
38 State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 321 (W. Va. 2006). 
39 State v. Camarena, 145 P.3d 267, 273-74 (Or. App. 2006); see also 
Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 714 (Nev. 2006) (four-part test for 911 
calls). 
40 Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 321-22. 
41 Roger W. Kirst, Confrontation Rules After Davis v. Washington, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 635 (2007). 
42 Id. 
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the pre-Davis tendency to find all 911 calls by distraught victims 
to be nontestimonial has reappeared in the post-Davis cases. 
For example, People v. Walker43 held that a 911 call was a 
call for help, even though it was made by a neighbor to whom 
the victim fled seeking help after she escaped from her home by 
jumping from a second-story balcony while the defendant 
slept.44 The victim told her neighbor that she could not return 
home, which indicated that the specific incident was over. 
Indeed, the defendant claimed that the victim had waited two 
hours after the beating to ensure the defendant was asleep before 
fleeing.45 Thus, Walker seems to take a more global view that 
the emergency is resolved only when the defendant is captured. 
Although Walker briefly mentioned questions about whether 
the couple’s child was present, it gave no indication of where 
the child was, or that any violence had been threatened to the 
child.46 Ironically, the opinion did not discuss whether the 
neighbor could have testified to what the victim had initially 
said, although it held that the neighbor’s written narrative of the 
victim’s statement given to the police when they arrived, was 
testimonial.47 The conviction was reversed because the details 
supplied by the later oral and written information provided to 
the police were found to be testimonial, but the 911 holding 
should not be considered surplusage. In other words, it suggests 
a pattern that is likely to be repeated in evaluating other 911 
calls, such as State v. Wright, in which the Minnesota Supreme 
Court48 found that the latter part of a 911 call, after the victim’s 
sister was told the defendant was in custody, was nontestimonial 
because the goal was to reassure her and her sister that the 
defendant had really been apprehended, not to create 
testimony.49 
                                                          
43 No. 250006, 2006 WL 3365521 (Mich. App. Nov. 21, 2006). 
44 Id. at *1. 
45 See facts discussed in People v. Walker, 697 N.W.2d 159, 161-62 
(Mich. App. 2005). 
46 Walker, 2006 WL 3365521. 
47 Id. at *4. 
48 No. Ao3-1197, 2007 WL 177690 (Minn. Jan. 25, 2007). 
49 Id. at *9-10. 
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Similarly, it is unclear whether the focus on assessing the 
emergency will result in every initial statement of a 911 call 
being deemed nontestimonial. Justice Scalia separated the 
investigatory collection of ex parte testimonial statements by the 
police from their attempted use at trial in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause.50 Recognizing the distinction between trial 
and investigatory use of 911 calls appears to permit a more 
cautious approach to evaluating their admissibility, encouraging 
judges to evaluate the tenor of the entire statement. Looking 
only at the investigatory function could arguably justify 
admitting the first sentence of every conversation, because the 
caller always has to explain the nature of the incident in order 
for the operator to determine how to resolve the perceived 
emergency. Calling a statement nontestimonial until the operator 
can figure out whether the danger is past or present would 
effectively deny the right of cross-examination based on the 
sentence structure and speech pattern of the caller, hardly a 
principled distinction for separating Sixth Amendment wheat 
from chaff. 
Yet this is already what some courts are doing. For example, 
in State v Camarena,51 the victim called 911, hung up, and 
when the operator called her back to ask if there was a problem, 
she answered, “Yeah, my boyfriend hit me but then he left.”52 
Before providing details she also specified he had departed by 
car.53 Evaluating the totality of the circumstances, Camarena 
held that the victim’s initial response as well as her response 
concerning the nature of the injuries were not testimonial 
because they occurred immediately after the assault, the 
defendant could have returned, it was likely that the victim was 
seeking assistance against a possible renewal of the attack, and 
the level of formality of the interrogation was unlike that in 
Crawford and Hammon.54 Thus, Justice Scalia appears unduly 
                                                          
50 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6. 
51 145 P.3d 267 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
52 Id. at 269. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 275. 
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optimistic that ongoing emergencies are easy to spot. 
Indeed, I would not be surprised if pressure emerges to 
change the typical 911 script to better fit with Davis by 
specifically asking as the first question whether the caller is 
presently in danger. The second question would be what is the 
nature of the ongoing emergency, before more identifying details 
are requested. As a practical matter, most emergency systems 
will display the address of the caller even without an inquiry. 
Davis also expressed concern that the police need to know the 
identity of the assailant in order to assess the threat to their own 
safety and danger to the potential victim.55 However, this 
information can be revealed by asking if the individual is known 
to have access to a weapon or currently appears to be on drugs, 
as opposed to asking the identity of the defendant or specific 
details of the defendant’s conduct. If the defendant is armed and 
the incident is still in progress, Davis suggests that his identity is 
needed to end the emergency,56 but in other circumstances 
identity appears only necessary to decide whom to prosecute. 
Given that the 911 system is considered a proxy for police 
involvement, we should expect the defense to challenge the 
order and content of questions that appear designed to produce 
nontestimonial statements despite Justice Scalia’s belief that 
emergencies are immutable and not affected by police conduct.57 
For example, in Vinson v. Texas,58 the victim’s identification 
of her boyfriend as her assailant to an officer at the scene was 
held to be nontestimonial, in part because the officer said he 
didn’t feel safe until backup arrived, in a situation where the 
defendant entered the room and yelled at the victim who was 
recently and badly injured.59 One would assume that the officer 
                                                          
55 126 S. Ct. at 2279. 
56 See, e.g., Lile v. State, No. 79A02-0601-CR-31, 2006 WL 3306004, 
at *3 (Ind. App. Nov, 15, 2006) (affirming admission of 911 call made after 
defendant killed first victim, where caller was hiding under bed before 
defendant dragged her out and forced her into car). 
57 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6. 
58 Vinson v. State, Nos. 01-05-00784-CR, 01-05-00785-CR, 2006 WL 
2291000 (Tex. App. 1st, Aug. 10, 2006). 
59 Id. at *8-10. 
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could have controlled or separated the defendant, placing him in 
the squad car until he finished assessing the situation. 
Distinguishing the facts in Hammon because the assailant was 
not present during the interview seems fairly disingenuous, 
given that Hammon also tried to intervene and was separated 
from his wife.60 
Even reading certiorari dispositions concerning field 
investigations indicates that the dividing line between testimonial 
and nontestimonial statements is not as obvious as Davis would 
suggest. For example, pre-Davis, in State v. Hembertt,61 the 
Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the admission of a detailed 
statement made by a woman to police responding to a 911 call. 
The victim volunteered such an amount of detail that the officers 
stopped her to locate the assailant. The emergency was not 
considered to be over until the defendant was found inside. 
However, were the details of the assault necessary to resolve the 
emergency? The Supreme Court denied certiorari, upholding the 
conviction,62 although numerous other cases were vacated. 
While one can never know the reason for a denial, Hembertt 
sends a message that admission of detail is not fatal to a 
conviction, whether because it is not error or harmless error, 
and encourages courts to find statements to be nontestimonial 
whenever the defendant remains in the home, even though the 
victim is outside and no longer in danger. 
Defining the scope of the emergency also proved difficult in 
State v. Warsame,63 which held that statements made to two 
officers were nontestimonial, although the victim’s first words 
revealed, “My boyfriend just beat me up.”64 The court reasoned 
that the woman’s sister who was in the fleeing vehicle with the 
defendant might be in danger, although the victim did not claim 
she was kidnapped.65 It was also unclear what happened to 
another sister who was at the house where the victim had been 
                                                          
60 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. 
61 696 N.W.2d 473, 479 (Neb. 2005). 
62 Hembertt v. Nebraska, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006). 
63 723 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. App. 2006). 
64 Id. at 642. 
65 Id. at  641-42. 
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beaten.66 In deciding where to draw the line, the court concluded 
that the ongoing emergency “need not be limited to the 
complainant’s predicament or the location where she is 
questioned by police.”67 Thus, the complainant’s entire narrative 
was considered nontestimonial.68 
Another questionable result in a domestic violence case was 
reached in State v. Rodriguez,69 which held that statements to an 
officer on two separate occasions were nontestimonial cries for 
help, although on both occasions the statements were made 
outside of the presence of the defendant.70 Indeed, the same 
result would have been justified by a forfeiture analysis, given 
the victim’s statements about being threatened by the defendant 
and his family, and that the police couldn’t protect her or her 
child. Only the statement that the defendant was inside the home 
underneath the couch with a knife71 appears arguably 
nontestimonial. 
Yet even this points out the difficulty with the standard. As 
previously mentioned, many judges understandably view the 
emergency as ongoing until the defendant is apprehended for 
purposes of determining whether statements are testimonial, 
despite the fact that the victim is out of harm’s way. Thus, the 
confrontation right seems dictated by the fortuity of whether the 
defendant is still at home, rather than has fled. Some courts go 
further, suggesting the emergency is not over if he could return. 
Such results appear totally out of keeping with the Supreme 
Court’s narrow view of context in assessing whether an 
emergency existed in Hammon, and quite different from the 
nontestimonial statement of a victim running out of an apartment 
screaming, “that’s him, that’s him. He’s the one that just hit 
me.”72 In that case, the officers acted as Justice Scalia 
                                                          
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 641. 
68 State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637, 643 (Minn. App. 2006). 
69 722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). 
70 Id. at 140-41. 
71 Id. at 141. 
72 State v. McKenzie, No. 87610, 2006 WL 3095671 (Ohio Ct. App., 
Nov. 2, 2006). 
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envisioned, securing the defendant in the police car before 
asking the victim for details, which were deemed testimonial.73 
II.  ASSESSING WHETHER A STATEMENT MADE TO SOMEONE 
OTHER THAN LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL IS TESTIMONIAL 
Whether Crawford and Davis leave a gaping hole in 
Confrontation Clause protection by which statements made to 
people having no relationship to law enforcement can march in 
without any regulation is unresolved. Outside of the child abuse 
context, cases generally reject protection for statements made to 
private individuals.74 Several domestic violence cases have found 
such statements to be nontestimonial.75 However, Davis 
specifically left open whether statements made to someone other 
than law enforcement personnel are testimonial.76 Realistically, 
when a victim cries out for help to those around her such as 
neighbors, relatives, friends, acquaintances, or strangers on the 
street, the question will focus on what assistance the victim 
hopes to receive. Only when it appears that the cry is to obtain 
police aid for a completed criminal act will the calls likely be 
considered testimonial.77 In many cases, the confidant is not the 
person who calls the police, suggesting that the statement is not 
testimonial.78 This should help the prosecution, although it has 
                                                          
73 Id. at *5. 
74 Compare Compan v. People, 121 P.3d 876 (Colo. 2005) (finding that 
domestic violence victim’s statements to friend not testimonial) with King v. 
Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779) (holding that the admission 
of a young rape victim’s statements to her mother was error; cited with 
approval in Davis). See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990) 
(excluding child’s statements to private pediatrician as violating Confrontation 
Clause; holding implicitly approved in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58-59). 
75 See, e.g., Lile v. State, 2006 WL 3306004, at *1-3 (finding voice 
message to daughter as she saw defendant return with shotgun was 
nontestimonial). 
76 Davis, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.1. 
77 See State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323-24 (W. Va. 2006) 
(remanding to determine if statements of domestic violence victim to neighbor 
who called 911 were testimonial). 
78 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 561-62 
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troubling implications about the devaluation of cross-examination 
and live witnesses whenever the police are not involved. It also 
suggests inclusion of testimonial statements at trial may be 
viewed as harmless error when they duplicate admissible 
information. However, some courts appear to reject harmless 
error when the additional information provides persuasive 
details.79 
Another frequent source of testimony in domestic violence 
cases comes from medical personnel and records. Again, the 
question arises as to whether both the victim’s statements and 
the doctor’s diagnosis can be admitted if the declarant is absent 
from trial. Some courts determine whether the examination and 
questioning was for a “diagnostic purpose” and whether the 
“statement was the by-product of substantive medical activity.”80 
Most decisions concerning medical statements occur in child 
abuse cases.81 However, a few domestic violence and rape cases 
appear to find such statements nontestimonial when the physician 
has no role in investigating the assault,82 or when the statements 
describe the rape and resulting injuries but do not identify the 
defendant.83 
Questions are also raised when victims are subjected to 
sexual assaults and are then sent to a forensic unit for 
evaluation, which would appear to implicate testimonial 
concerns. Even here, some courts consider statements made to 
forensic nurses or to medical personnel in forensic units to be 
nontestimonial, despite their likely use for purposes of 
                                                          
(Mass. 2005). 
79 See, e.g., State v. Wright, 2007 WL 177690, at *11-13 (Minn. Jan. 
25, 2007). 
80 State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 527 (Conn. 2006), quoting In re T.T., 
815 N.E.2d 789, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (child abuse case). 
81 See Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a 
“Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay and 
Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2007). 
82 See, e.g., State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906, 912 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
83 See, e.g., State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1106-07 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2006). 
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prosecution.84 In discussing medical records, Clark v. State85 
found that it could not properly evaluate if the statements were 
testimonial because it was not clear who made them and whether 
they were volunteered or elicited for purposes of medical 
diagnosis. Thus, more detailed record keeping may be necessary 
to determine admissibility. 
III.  DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CRAWFORD/DAVIS APPROACH 
A major problem with Davis’ focus on ongoing emergencies 
is that it ignores a question that is key to any sound 
Confrontation Clause analysis: whether cross-examination would 
serve an important function at trial. Instead, claiming historical 
justification, which has been challenged both by then-Chief 
Justice Rehnquist in Crawford,86 and by the historian Thomas 
Davies,87 Davis asks why the statement was made, as if sincerity 
alone was at the heart of the right to confrontation. Even Justice 
Scalia softened his rigidly originalist Crawford analysis when he 
stated in Davis, “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the 
precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe 
for its extinction.”88 In the Crawford and Beyond symposium, 
Professor Tuerkheimer correctly critiques Davis as being out of 
sync with the realities of domestic violence, which she suggests 
would be better served by a relational approach that 
                                                          
84 See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 836-37 (Ohio 2006) 
(holding rape victim’s statements to nurse practitioner at forensic unit were 
nontestimonial); see generally, Allie Phillips, HealthCare Providers’ Roles 
After Crawford, Davis & Hammon, 40 PROSECUTOR 18 (Oct. 2006) 
(discussing forensic nurse case law and suggesting ways to ensure statements 
are considered to be nontestimonial). 
85 No. A-8890, 2006 WL 2578642 (Alaska App. Sept. 6, 2006). 
86 541 U.S. at 69-74 (concurring in judgment). 
87 See generally Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and 
When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 
71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005); Thomas Y. Davies, Not “The Framers’ 
Design:” How the Framing Era Ban against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the 
Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the Orginial 
Confrontation Clause, 15 J. L. & POL’Y  349 (2007). 
88 126 S. Ct. at 2278 n.5. 
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acknowledges the context of the battering relationship.89 
However, in my view the testimonial approach cannot easily 
accommodate that shift doctrinally. Unfortunately, this 
approach, which is rooted in a timeframe when women were 
still subject to the common law rule of thumb which permitted a 
husband to beat his wife with a rod “no thicker than his 
thumb,”90 is not likely to produce a result favorable to domestic 
violence victims.91 Therefore, while I agree with Professor 
Tuerkheimer about the importance of forfeiture, I would also 
rethink the domestic violence litigation framework, targeting 
criminal justice resources to obtain more pretrial cross-
examination, and encourage women to testify, even if they 
recant their accusations.92 
The testimonial approach ignores the classic role of cross-
examination in exposing mistake, and in the case of modern 
expansive interpretations of excited utterances, highlighting the 
possibility of fabrication. It also downplays the function of 
cross-examination and face-to-face confrontation as to 
nontestimonial hearsay. This is particularly troubling given that 
the world of the founding fathers had very little hearsay in 
contrast to the liberal creation of modern hearsay exceptions by 
federal and state governments. The fact that most of today’s 
hearsay could not be admitted in 1791 seems not to be factored 
into the current Confrontation Clause analysis, even though the 
newly minted and expansively interpreted hearsay exceptions are 
surely a product of the same government that the founders 
distrusted enough to adopt the Confrontation Clause. 
The practical difficulty in modern Confrontation Clause 
analysis is how to harmonize the right of confrontation with 
modern trial practices that thrive on hearsay. The reliability 
approach of Roberts and its progeny totally denigrated the right 
of cross-examination and live testimony. Yet Crawford and 
                                                          
89 See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, A Relational Approach to 
Confrontation and Its Loss,  15 J. L & POL’Y 725 (2007). 
90 See State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 13 (S.D. 1992) (discussing 
history of domestic violence). 
91 Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 312. 
92 Id.at 367-73. 
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Davis have substituted an approach that is almost arbitrary in its 
result, with the potential of unfairly harming both the 
prosecution and the defense. Confrontation is absolutely required 
for statements labeled “testimonial,” regardless of the absence of 
any fault by the prosecution in failing to secure cross-
examination, even when such statements are both reliable and 
the only evidence on the disputed issue. For example, it does 
not matter that the unavailable victim died unexpectedly in an 
unrelated accident, even though the victim was the only 
eyewitness to the crime and the other evidence is inconclusive as 
to the defendant’s guilt. Yet confrontation is denied for all other 
statements, even when cross-examination is critical, with at best 
a reliability check for statements that are admitted via hearsay 
exceptions that are not firmly rooted.93 Thus, the focus is not on 
the impact of the statement to the defense and the criticality of 
cross-examination, but on the abstract notion of whether the 
statement is defined as testimonial. 
In contrast, an accusatory approach to defining what is 
testimonial, as had been suggested by Professor Mosteller,94 
                                                          
93 See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 323-25 (arguing that 
nontestimonial hearsay should be reviewed for reliability, whether under 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990), or under a due process 
rationale). While Davis asserts that testimonial statements define the 
perimeter, not simply the core of the right to Confrontation, 126 S. Ct. at 
2274, this dicta is not necessary to its holding, since an excited utterance 
would not require any additional reliability analysis under the Roberts’ 
progeny. Moreover, Crawford did not challenge the holding in Wright, 
excluding unreliable hearsay of a child to a private doctor, which would 
appear to be an incorrect result unless the statement was testimonial. Post-
Davis cases are split as to whether nontestimonial hearsay must be reliable. 
See generally James J. Duane, The Cryptographic Coroner’s Report On Ohio 
v. Roberts, 21 CRIM. JUST. 37 (Fall, 2005). However, in Whorton v. Bocktin, 
127 S.Ct. 1173, 1183 (2007), Justice Alito unequivocally states tat under 
Crawford, “the Confrontation Clause has no application to such 
[nontestimonial] statements and therefore permits their admission even if they 
lack indicia of reliability.” 
94 See generally Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic 
Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST. 14 
(Summer, 2005); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford’s Impact on Hearsay 
Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. 
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appears closer to satisfying concerns about the need for cross-
examination, as well as promoting the fairness values associated 
with requiring witnesses to appear at trial and face the accused 
when testifying. Davis’ concentration on discerning primary 
intent in situations that clearly manifest equally strong ties to the 
dual goals of obtaining help and assisting the prosecution will 
simply create a new set of crazy quilt results that will no doubt 
be as unpredictable, and in some cases as unfair, as those 
produced by Roberts. 
Moreover, to the extent that the objective test results in 
ignoring an improper subjective motivation of an officer to 
create testimony to be used at trial, it could result in decisions 
that are viewed as unjust. In other words, the objective test 
adopted by Whren v. United States95 and its progeny in the 
Fourth Amendment context has provoked an outcry because it 
could allow a car stop when probable cause exists, despite the 
decision of an officer to stop the defendant for an improper 
purpose, such as racial profiling.96 Similarly, some fear that an 
objective Sixth Amendment standard could also mask potential 
prosecutorial misconduct. Given the ambiguous references in 
Crawford and Davis about whether interrogation should be 
viewed from the officer’s perspective even if the declarant is 
unaware of the improper motivation, one would hope that while 
the declarant’s intent should typically control the confrontation 
analysis, that improper police motivation would also result in a 
statement being deemed testimonial. It has been suggested that 
the Court should exclude evidence if it is found that police 
officers systematically attempt to evade the Confrontation 
Clause.97 This would be in accord with Missouri v. Seibert, 
which excluded a confession obtained by a technique that “by 
any objective measure reveal[ed] a police strategy adapted to 
                                                          
L. REV. 411 (2005) (arguing that the most important feature is the core 
concern of whether certain witnesses were making criminal accusations 
against the defendant. Beyond that, a rigid formula should not be imposed). 
95 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
96 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 372 (2001) 
(O’Connor, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
97 Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 220. 
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undermine the Miranda warnings.”98 
IV.  ESTABLISHING FORFEITURE AND OTHER PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Davis reiterated Crawford’s suggestion that forfeiture could 
result in admitting testimonial statements that were otherwise 
banned by the Confrontation Clause, on equitable grounds.99 
While Davis refused to treat domestic violence differently from 
other cases in the testimonial analysis, it recognized that “[t]his 
particular type of crime is notoriously susceptible to intimidation 
or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not testify at 
trial.”100 Such offending conduct was described as 
“undermin[ing] the judicial process by procuring or coercing 
silence from witnesses and victims.”101 Moreover, the defendant 
was said to “have the duty to refrain from acting in ways that 
destroy the integrity of the criminal-trial system.”102 However, 
no guidance was given about the specific evidence needed to 
demonstrate forfeiture and whether intent to intimidate a witness 
is necessary. 
I stand by my earlier views of forfeiture, that intent should 
not be required in cases where the defendant has murdered the 
victim.103 Despite the fact that historically, forfeiture was limited 
to witness-tampering cases,104 after Crawford most courts have 
applied the doctrine to admit statements of murdered domestic 
violence victims, where witness tampering is not involved.105 
For example, in United States v. Garcia-Meza,106 the Court 
                                                          
98 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004). 
99 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
100 Id. at 2279-80. 
101 Id. at 2280. 
102 Id. 
103 Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 363-64. 
104 See generally James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the 
Misnamed Exception for “Forfeiture by Wrongdoing,” 14 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1193 (2006) (arguing that intent has always been required). 
105 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 114 (Tex. 2006) 
(discussing caselaw, but not resolving issue of whether intent is necessary). 
106 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005). Accord State v. Brooks, No. 
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specifically noted that the federal forfeiture hearsay exception’s 
requirement that the defendant intended to prevent the witness 
from testifying did not control the constitutional analysis of 
forfeiture. In other words, constitutional forfeiture is not 
restricted by the statutory requirements of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(6). Mattox v. United States107 rejected a 
Confrontation Clause challenge to the admission of the prior 
testimony of two witnesses in a murder trial who had died 
before the retrial.108 Rereading Mattox reinforces my belief that, 
as is often expressed in other contexts, the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact. In discussing the relationship of death to 
confrontation, Mattox noted that such rules of law, “however 
beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must 
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case.”109 My only hesitation about abandoning 
intent is Justice Scalia’s brief mention in Davis that forfeiture 
was codified by Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), since that 
would appear to equate the rule with the constitutional doctrine. 
This dicta, however, was general and did not address 
interpreting forfeiture in domestic violence cases when the 
victim’s death is often accomplished in ways that are aimed at 
frustrating prosecution. Previous violence and threats instill fear 
in the victims who downplay their risk of continuing danger, and 
their murders are often accomplished at home without witnesses. 
These victim’s statements are best analogized to the dying 
declarations of individuals whose deaths are witnessed.110 After 
Davis, courts have continued to approve of the use of forfeiture 
in murders implicating domestic violence without requiring any 
intent to prohibit her from testifying at trial.111 
                                                          
W2004-02834-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2523991, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
Aug. 31, 2006). 
107 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
108 Id. at 240. 
109 Id. at 243. 
110 See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 363-64. 
111 See People v. Giles, 152 P.3d 433 (Cal. 2007) (finding forfeiture 
where defendant claimed self defense in killing former girlfriend and her 
statements concerned an unrelated claim of domestic violence); State v. 
RAEDER 6/22/2007  1:12 AM 
780 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
State v. Romero,112 a pre-Davis decision that was bound by 
jurisdictional case law that required intent for establishing 
forfeiture, discussed what it characterized as compelling reasons 
as to why a showing of intent to procure silence should not be 
required in cases where the defendant has killed the witness.113 
Citing cases that applied forfeiture without a showing of intent, 
Romero noted two reasons to reject intent: (1) cases confused 
forfeiture with waiver, and (2) forfeiture is equitable, and does 
not hinge on the defendant’s motive.114 While I question whether 
totally unreliable hearsay should come in by forfeiture, 
practically, the evidence being admitted in domestic violence 
homicides comes in via what Roberts would have called firmly 
rooted exceptions such as excited utterances, or ad hoc 
trustworthiness exceptions that would meet any constitutionally 
based reliability test. In other words, they are not being admitted 
via the forfeiture exception. 
Most domestic violence forfeiture cases will relate to live 
victims who do not appear. In such cases, I agree that the 
traditional definition of forfeiture that requires intent to procure 
the absence or silence of the witness should be followed. 
Unfortunately, it is often difficult to identify the cause for the 
victim’s nonappearance at trial. As State v. Mechling noted, 
some victims fear retaliation, which can include threats not only 
to the victim, but also to the victim’s children.115 
Indeed, some women fear that the batterers will claim 
custody of their child or cause the victim to come under scrutiny 
of the child welfare system. The suggestion of some prosecutors 
that forfeiture should be presumed when a domestic violence 
victim is absent from trial has not gained any judicial support. I 
disagree that battering relationships can by themselves establish 
                                                          
Brooks, 2006 WL 2523991, at *8 (finding forfeiture where defendant beat his 
girlfriend to death). Cf. State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 533-34 (Wis. 
2007) (finding forfeiture where wife was murdered by husband, but no 
evidence existed of prior domestic violence). 
112 133 P.3d 842 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). 
113 Id. at 852. 
114 Id.; accord, Giles, 152 P.3d 433. 
115 State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 324, n.11 (W. Va. 2006) 
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forfeiture116 because I believe that individualized evidence is 
required. I am also uncomfortable with applying a presumption 
of forfeiture for unavailable domestic violence victims, since the 
burden of proof should be on the prosecutor, rather than on the 
defendant, because it is difficult to prove a negative. In other 
words, requiring the defendant to show there were reasons other 
than coercion for the victim’s absence may be more difficult 
than requiring the prosecution to establish evidence of 
intimidation. However, I recognize that if the presumption only 
affects the burden of production, and not the burden of 
persuasion, the defendant could rebut it by any evidence of 
another reason the complainant did not appear. 
Even decisions such as Mechling117 that appear receptive to 
forfeiture require fact-based evidence of forfeiture in the specific 
case. However, the specific pattern of abuse in each case should 
be considered in the forfeiture analysis because it provides the 
context for understanding the pressure that is brought to bear by 
the defendant on the victim in the case. Thus, previous history 
should be factored into the analysis, including prior charges of 
abuse, and any previous recantations by the declarant. Similarly, 
evidence of further abuse after the incident should be considered 
as conduct aimed at procuring absence or lack of cooperation 
even when no direct threat can be demonstrated.118 Moreover, 
PTSD should be considered a significant factor in deciding 
forfeiture, since the victim’s hypersensitive responses can be 
traced to the defendant’s initial conduct. As Mechling pointed 
out, decisions concerning forfeiture are most difficult when the 
batterer’s actions, such as threats about her never calling the 
police, precede the current domestic charge.119 
Davis suggested, without deciding, that forfeiture would be 
decided by a preponderance of the evidence standard,120 but did 
not discuss any distinction between the showing necessary for a 
                                                          
116 See, e.g., Andrew King Ries, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing, 39 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 441, 458 (2006). 
117 633 S.E.2d at 324-26. 
118 See, e.g., id. at 325. 
119 Id. 
120 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
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decision made pursuant to a federal evidentiary rule as opposed 
to a constitutional mandate. Indeed, the Court ignored state 
decisions requiring a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
However, since the voluntariness of confessions and Miranda 
violations are determined by a preponderance,121 it is difficult to 
argue that forfeiture requires a higher standard, whether in a 
hearsay exception or for constitutional purposes. The only 
constitutional right that currently appears to impose a clear and 
convincing evidence standard is found in the nearly 40-year old 
decision of United States v. Wade, which permitted the 
government to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a 
constitutionally defective in-court identification was based upon 
observations of the suspect apart from the lineup identification 
held without counsel.122 Davis also indicated that hearsay 
evidence, including the unavailable witness’ out-of-court 
statements, may be considered at any forfeiture hearing,123 but 
left open whether such statements alone can establish forfeiture, 
or whether additional evidence is required. 
Interestingly, Mechling discounts prosecution claims that 
domestic violence convictions can never be obtained without the 
use of the victim’s statements because convictions are routinely 
obtained in murder cases without such statements.124 However, 
this ignores the reality that the government allocates more 
resources to murder prosecutions than to domestic violence 
cases, particularly misdemeanors. Generally, prosecutors will be 
forced to expend more resources to obtain evidence of 
forfeiture. This could require sending an advocate or officer to 
talk to the complainant or to neighbors who may have 
information. Adam Krischer has provided a number of valuable 
suggestions about obtaining evidence to support forfeiture.125 
                                                          
121 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); Lego v. Twomey, 
404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972). 
122 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
123 126 S. Ct. at 2280. 
124 633 S.E.2d at 325, n.13. 
125 Adam Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid: 
Applying Common Sense to Crawford v. Washington in Domestic Violence 
Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR 14, 15 (Dec. 2004). 
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For example, phone records subpoenaed from jail may reveal 
tapes or explain a recantation at trial. Voicemail messages, e-
mail, or caller ID logs indicating large numbers of calls may 
also be useful.126 However, in a world of limited prosecutorial 
resources, proving forfeiture in misdemeanor cases, which 
encompass a large percentage of the current domestic violence 
caseload, will likely be difficult, reinforcing my view that we 
must rethink domestic violence prosecutions. 
Other procedural issues also come into play. For example, 
Davis recognized that some of the 911 statements may have been 
testimonial, but suggested that in limine hearings could be used 
to redact or exclude the testimonial portions of the statements.127 
In this context, some attempts at parsing statements may result 
in a determination that admission of the redacted statement 
would be misleading, supporting exclusion for undue prejudice. 
State v. Kirby,128 a case where the victim was kidnapped by a 
friend of her husband, recognized that: 
some isolated portions of the telephone call, 
specifically when the complainant described to Gomes 
the injuries and chest pains that affected her at the 
time of the conversation, are not testimonial in nature 
and, therefore, would not by themselves be barred 
under Crawford. We conclude, however, that the 
telephone recording remains inadmissible in its 
entirety because the recording is so heavily dominated 
by testimonial statements that redacting them in 
accordance with the procedure directed in Davis v. 
Washington . . . would leave the nontestimonial 
portions of the conversation without any meaningful 
context.129 
Thus, attorneys must focus not only on whether statements 
                                                          
126 See, e.g., State v. Jens, 724 N.W.2d 702 (Table), No. 2005AP2144, 
2006 WL 3007498, at ¶ 27 (Wis. App. Oct 24, 2006) (dealing with 
audiotapes of telephone conversations where defendant discussed ways for 
victim to avoid subpoena forfeited right to complain about her not testifying). 
127 126 S. Ct. at 2277-78. 
128 908 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2006). 
129 Id. at 523 n.18. 
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are testimonial, but also on whether they can be effectively 
excised from otherwise admissible nontestimonial narratives. 
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR PROSECUTORS IN LIGHT OF DAVIS 
 Obviously, the shift in Confrontation Clause analysis makes 
the testimony of the victim at trial or preliminary hearing 
critical. Thus, the continued support of victim’s advocates and 
coordinators remains a key component to successful prosecution, 
and given the cost to the system and to victims’ autonomy, these 
criminal justice resources should be allocated to risky offenders 
and felonies, with diversion being the route for less serious 
cases, or those with significant evidentiary problems.130 
Moreover, while the vast majority of domestic violence 
complainants have suffered psychological injuries beyond the 
incident in question, it would be unrealistic to assume that 
everyone who complains about a particular incident is telling the 
truth. 
Anecdotally, the most common causes of lying or 
exaggeration relate to anger over male infidelity or child custody 
disputes. Thus, prosecutors must use their independent judgment 
in evaluating whether the victim is being entirely forthcoming 
about the entire nature of the incident as well as whether the 
refusal to cooperate is because a lying complainant has had a 
change of heart. In other words, the need for confrontation is 
not eliminated simply because the case relates to domestic 
violence, even if most allegations are likely true and many 
domestic violence victims do not call the police, let alone 
testify.131 
It is well known that even when the complainant is a true 
victim of domestic violence, it is likely that she will recant when 
                                                          
130 See Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 367-73; see also Paul C. 
Friday, et al., Evaluating the Impact of a Specialized Domestic Violence 
Police Unit (Oct. 2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/215916.pdf 
(discussing targeting of more serious domestic violence offenders) (last 
visited on March 25, 2007). 
131 See, e.g., State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 324 (W. Va. 2006). 
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she testifies at trial.132 While prior inconsistent statements are 
typically admitted to impeach her credibility, it is their 
substantive use that is necessary for successful domestic violence 
prosecutions. Only a minority of states permit the substantive 
use of all prior inconsistent statements of witnesses.133 
Therefore, prosecutors should support efforts to enact such an 
exception, which in conjunction with expert testimony and the 
introduction of the defendant’s prior bad acts, will increase the 
probability of conviction. Typically, there will be enough 
circumstantial evidence to meet any challenge based on the 
sufficiency of evidence when the prior inconsistent statement 
provides a key element. In this regard, some states apply a 
totality of the circumstances approach to reviewing the evidence 
for sufficiency to uphold verdicts even where the inconsistent 
statement provides the only evidence of identity of the 
defendant.134 In jurisdictions where prior inconsistent statements 
must be given under oath in a proceeding to be used 
substantively, prosecutors should have the victim testify at a 
preliminary hearing, even if they typically indict defendants or 
are permitted to use hearsay at preliminary hearings. 
In addition, because of the likelihood the victim will refuse 
to testify, evidence of witness intimidation should always be 
sought to support an argument of forfeiture. However, even if 
the complainant testifies and recants, intimidation evidence 
should be admissible as going to the bias of the witness. Such 
evidence should survive a prejudice challenge since, as in United 
States v. Abel,135 its probative value is extremely high in that it 
explains the reason for the change of testimony in a way that 
jurors can understand, as opposed to the less intuitive 
explanation by experts as to why women do not readily leave 
their batterers. 
                                                          
132 See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 768-69 (2005). 
133 See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 26.5-26.7 (7th 
ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004); Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 351-52. 
134 See, e.g, People v. Cuervas, 906 P.2d 1290, 1304 (Cal. 1995) (using 
a substantial evidence test). 
135 469 U.S. 45 (1984). 
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A few prosecutors I have talked to over the years believe 
that because women will virtually always downplay their 
abuser’s conduct, it is better not to ask the woman for her 
version of the facts before trial, and instead simply let the 
woman testify. The explanation for why she has recanted her 
initial statement to the police is offered via expert testimony, 
other evidence and jury argument. While this approach might be 
considered controversial, those who use it believe that 
complainants are more likely to testify when they can retain 
their dignity and do not feel doubly battered by the system. As a 
result, focusing on the other evidence of abuse is felt to produce 
more convictions than arguing with the victim. In a post-Davis 
world, any approach that encourages women to testify should be 
considered. 
Only if cross-examination at the preliminary hearing is 
limited will such testimony present a Crawford/Davis problem 
when introduced at trial because of the absence of the witness.136 
Indeed, where statutory limits on preliminary hearing testimony 
exist, even if prosecutors are loath to urge expansion of 
testimony at all preliminary hearings, they could in select cases 
indicate to the judge that they will not object to full cross-
examination, providing the opportunity necessary to meet a later 
challenge if the witness does not appear at trial. While a statute 
that only permits full examination in domestic violence, but not 
other cases, might be questionable, creating a statutory exception 
that allows full cross-examination for any case in which the 
victim is uncooperative should pass constitutional muster. All 
such cases, whether domestic violence or otherwise, would 
warrant preservation of cross-examined testimony as quickly as 
possible after the incident. In this regard, the statute could 
include a presumption that full cross-examination of domestic 
violence victims should be permitted in light of the empirical 
evidence of their non-cooperation. 
Finally, as Professor Lininger and I have argued, more use 
                                                          
136 Remember the Ladies, supra note *, at 355-58 (discussing the 
difference between limited and full cross-examination at preliminary 
hearings); Cf., Howard v. State, 853 N.E.2d 461, 468-70 (Ind. 2006) 
(discovery deposition satisfied Crawford). 
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should be made of federal prosecutions for gun possession.137 
Large numbers of individuals are prohibited from owning a 
weapon because they have been convicted of a qualifying 
domestic violence misdemeanor or are subject to a qualifying 
protective order.138 The federal penalties for violating these 
statutes are typically greater than sentences for domestic 
violence assaults.139 Moreover, such prosecutions typically do 
not require the domestic violence victim to testify, because they 
focus on the prohibited possession of the weapon in light of the 
qualifying offense or protective order.140 Currently relatively 
few federal domestic violence weapons related charges are 
prosecuted, given the large number of individuals who run afoul 
of such bans.141 Joint efforts by state and federal prosecutors are 
needed to target dangerous domestic violence offenders who 
would otherwise escape conviction due to witness non-
cooperation. In addition, many states do not criminalize weapon 
possession by domestic violence offenders. Enacting such laws 
pose a way to ensure that domestic violence offenders do not 
escape conviction. 
When convicting a defendant in the absence of the victim 
appears problematic, it may be possible to forgo a new criminal 
case if he has previously committed other crimes, whether 
domestic violence related or not. The key is whether he is still 
subject to probation, parole or supervised release, since his 
conduct will also violate the conditions of his release. Such 
violations are easier to prove because they are typically 
established by a preponderance of the evidence,142 rather than by 
the more exacting beyond a reasonable doubt standard. More 
importantly, revocations are not subject to evaluation under the 
                                                          
137 Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Violence in Federal Court: Abused 
Women as Victims, Survivors and Offenders, 19 FED. SENTENCING RPTR. 91, 
94 (Dec. 2006); see generally Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm 
Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525 (2003). 
138 Raeder, supra note * at 92. 
139 Id. at 92-93. 
140 Id. at 95. 
141 Id. at 92-93. 
142 See, e.g., Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind. 2005). 
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Confrontation Clause, which is considered a trial right.143 
Therefore, cross-examination can be denied for good cause,144 
which would likely be established by the unavailability of the 
declarant. In other words, hearsay is usually acceptable 
evidence, unless so unreliable as to raise due process concerns. 
Given Roberts’ endorsement of the reliability of firmly rooted 
hearsay exceptions, the excited utterances that are the bread and 
butter of domestic violence prosecutions would undoubtedly 
meet any due process reliability test. Ironically, according to the 
recital of the facts in Davis, Hammon was also found guilty of 
violating his probation.145 However, neither the Indiana Supreme 
Court nor the United States Supreme Court discussed whether 
his sentence was longer than permitted solely for the violation of 
probation, even though Hammon’s one-year sentence for the 
new battery was suspended for all but 20 days, and he was 
ordered to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and 
counseling program.146 Of course, unless the defendant has 
previously been convicted of a felony, any potential sentence 
will not reflect the seriousness of many domestic violence 
crimes, though revocations have the benefit of imposing swift 
and predictable incarceration. 
CONCLUSION 
Crawford left many unanswered questions about how to 
define testimonial statements in domestic violence cases, where 
victims typically make frantic 911 calls or greet police officers 
with frightened pleas for help when they arrive at the scene. 
Since most domestic violence victims do not cooperate with the 
prosecution, the two years after Crawford produced conflicting 
                                                          
143 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 
U.S. 39, 52 (1987) (Powell, J.). 
144 Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985) (holding that 
probationer is entitled under due process to cross-examine adverse witnesses, 
unless the hearing body specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation). 
145 126 S. Ct. at 2272-73. 
146 Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 447. 
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decisions about the admissibility of their excited utterances and 
doomed many domestic violence prosecutions. In Davis, the 
Court addressed the two most common domestic violence 
scenarios, 911 calls and field investigations. Unfortunately, 
Davis’ bright line for evaluating testimonial statements is likely 
to prove illusory given the vagueness of its definition of ongoing 
emergencies. In addition, courts must grapple with whether 
intent is necessary to justify forfeiture. Nobody scored a 
knockout punch in Davis: prosecutors must assume that most 
statements of unavailable declarants made after the incident to 
police are inadmissible, regardless of how excited the declarant 
is; defense counsel must assume that most 911 calls will be 
admitted, and may increasingly find that nontestimonial 
statements are no longer tested for reliability; domestic violence 
victims must assume that the context of their abuse will be 
ignored in evaluating whether they face an ongoing emergency; 
and judges must continue to read tea leaves until the Supreme 
Court’s inevitable next foray into Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. 
